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Audit summary 
Information and communications technologies (ICT) are now extensively embedded 
into our modern lifestyles. Many innovative technologies are emerging, and teaching 
practice and content is now increasingly expected to be delivered ‘anytime, anywhere’. 
Governments across Australia and in most other developed countries invest heavily in 
ICT for use in schools.  
Over the past nine years, the Department of Education and Early Childhood 
Development (DEECD) has spent around $1.6 billion on the provision of ICT services 
for government schools. This amount excludes Commonwealth funding and schools’ 
own direct ICT expenditure. DEECD estimates that it will spend a further $2.6 billion 
over the next 10 years on ICT investment for government schools. 
The term ‘learning technologies’ refers to a broad range of ICT tools that can be used 
to support learning, teaching and assessment. These tools include interactive boards 
and learning materials as well as networked technology such as online learning 
environments. Learning technologies also include devices such as handheld, desktop 
or laptop computers. 
This audit reviewed the effectiveness of the application of learning technologies in 
government schools. In particular, the audit focused on two key DEECD learning 
technologies initiatives: VicSmart and the Ultranet. 
The audit assessed in detail whether DEECD has: 
• conducted robust research on the most appropriate use of ICT in government 
school teaching environments 
• developed effective strategies to implement learning technologies in government 
schools and supported teaching staff to adopt these technologies 
• monitored achievement of desired outcomes, including realisation of purported 
benefits described in business cases used to support funding decisions for 
VicSmart and the Ultranet. 
Conclusion 
DEECD’s Digital Learning Statement (the Statement) does not provide a clear action 
plan or framework for investment in learning technologies. There is no supporting 
strategy or further detail to the Statement. This means that departmental staff and 
school leaders have little guidance on how future learning technology initiatives can be 
appropriately planned and integrated to build upon past and present ICT investments. 
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Planning for the VicSmart high-speed fibre-optic network for all government schools 
was underpinned by a robust needs and options analysis. Although the project was a 
less complex infrastructure rollout, it was well executed and is delivering its desired 
benefits. The high-speed connectivity that VicSmart provides is a key enabler of 
current and future digital learning in government schools. 
In contrast, the Ultranet, the Statement’s key foundation plank and key enabler, was 
poorly planned and implemented. Six years after its announcement as a government 
priority, it is yet to achieve expected benefits for students, parents and schools. It is 
significantly late, more than 80 per cent over its first announced budget, has very low 
uptake by users, and does not have the functionality originally intended. 
This audit identified a number of serious probity, procurement and financial 
management issues surrounding the Ultranet project. DEECD’s tender process lacked 
rigour and was seriously flawed. There is little confidence in the costing and financial 
management practices around the Ultranet project, and limited assurance that the 
selected outcome represented value for money. 
Findings 
Digital Learning Statement 
The Digital Learning Statement—the government’s current policy document on the use 
of learning technologies—was not informed by robust and comprehensive research 
and does not make a clear and cogent case for government investment in learning 
technologies.  
The Statement does not deliver on the directive in the 2008 Blueprint for Education 
and Early Childhood Development to provide a plan of action to use learning 
technologies in teaching and learning. A review of DEECD’s advice to the Minister for 
Education shows that the government was not advised that the Statement did not 
comply with the Blueprint’s directive to develop and deliver a strategy.  
To date, there has been no accompanying detailed strategy developed to support the 
Statement, even though this was originally planned. 
VicSmart high-speed broadband for schools 
Planning for VicSmart was underpinned by a robust needs and options analysis, as 
demonstrated by its 2005 business case, which articulated the needs to be addressed 
and provided a clear rationale for the purchase of high-speed fibre-optic broadband 
connectivity. The business case provided confidence that the project was achievable 
and could be delivered as planned. 
The VicSmart procurement process was streamlined by using a mandated  
whole-of-government single-source provider. The fibre-optic system is performing as 
expected and has been upgraded incrementally to meet emerging data and 
connectivity needs across the government school system. 
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Ultranet e-learning system 
The Ultranet project was poorly planned and implemented. None of its three business 
cases had a well thought out needs analysis or gave considered options to deliver the 
project. The various business cases did not answer the ‘Why invest?’ question for the 
Ultranet, nor did they provide a sound basis for the project’s approval. 
Some six years since its announcement as a government priority, the Ultranet has not 
delivered its main objectives:  
• to improve responsiveness to individual learning needs 
• to provide better information to parents, the school system and government 
• to improve the efficiency of the learning environment and school administration. 
Consistent with public sector practice, the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) 
and the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) provided advice to government at 
key decision points over the life of the Ultranet project.  
The project continued despite advice from central agencies that it should cease or be 
delayed. Further, there is no trail of documentary evidence to explain whether or how 
DEECD addressed the many critical issues raised by DPC and DTF. 
It is difficult to understand why the Ultranet procurement was able to proceed to 
contract execution, given the significant concerns raised by DPC and DTF, as well as 
the many adverse ratings that DEECD had received from various Gateway reviews 
since the project first commenced. 
Further, this audit detected a number of serious process and probity issues in relation 
to tendering and procurement for the Ultranet. DEECD has advised that it has 
commenced a number of actions and further detailed investigations in response to 
these matters. 
There is little confidence that the financial management practices relating to the 
Ultranet were sound and that full costs have been adequately recorded. VAGO 
estimates that actual capital and operating expenditure for the Ultranet was 
approximately $162 million as at June 2012, and by June 2013 it is likely to have cost 
approximately $180 million. DEECD has advised that it is currently investigating the 
financial practices in relation to this major ICT project. 
Despite this significant expenditure, no cost-benefit analysis has been conducted to 
determine whether the Ultranet provides value for money, or whether the same 
functionality could have been delivered more cost effectively. 
Performance indicators for the Ultranet have been revised down over time and do not 
provide appropriate measures of whether the Ultranet is achieving what the 
government expected when it funded the project.  
Use of the Ultranet is low, and declining. On average, only 10 per cent of students and 
27 per cent of teachers logged in on a monthly basis from July 2011 to May 2012. 
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An underlying factor which has limited the effective implementation of the Ultranet is 
the significant discrepancy between the original scope of the project and expected 
benefits and what has actually been implemented and delivered. This underscores the 
urgent need for DEECD to review whether it should continue to invest in this project. 
Further, DEECD did not adequately manage the change processes required to 
maximise the Ultranet’s acceptance and, therefore, the state’s return on investment. 
Teachers and parents were not appropriately trained and supported to use the 
Ultranet. Ultimately, the Ultranet is only a technology tool, and cannot by itself deliver 
the benefits intended from it. 
Recommendations 
Number Recommendation Page 
 The Department of Education and Early Childhood Development 
should:  
 
1. develop a comprehensive and evidence-based strategy or plan of 
action for use of learning technologies to underpin and guide the 
significant investment in ICT for government schools 
12 
2. develop performance indicators that measure both VicSmart’s 
ongoing operational performance and its achievement of intended 
benefits 
17 
3. urgently review its investment in the Ultranet, with a particular 
focus on: 
• assessing whether the contractor has delivered all functionality 
as required by the contract and what action, if any, needs to be 
taken to enforce the state’s rights 
• rigorously assessing its financial management practices and 
identifying the real, current cost of the Ultranet to determine 
the extent to which further investment is warranted 
• identifying and addressing the underlying causes of low 
take-up rates across the school system by teachers, students 
and parents 
• providing advice to government on the cost-benefit of 
decommissioning the system now against continuing to fund 
and rectify the system so that it can be implemented as 
originally expected 
31 
4. conduct an agency-wide review of its internal tendering, probity 
and financial management practices in light of the serious issues 
identified by this audit 
31 
5. expedite the provision of guidance to schools on the current status 
of the Ultranet as the department’s key learning technology 
investment, and clarify the policy context of schools’ autonomy in 
purchasing non-Ultranet learning technologies. 
31 
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Submissions and comments received 
In addition to progressive engagement during the course of the audit, in accordance 
with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report, or relevant extracts, were 
provided to the Department of Education and Early Childhood Development, the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet and the Department of Treasury and Finance, with 
a request for submissions or comments. 
Agency views have been considered in reaching our audit conclusions and are 
represented to the extent relevant and warranted in preparing this report. Their full 
section 16(3) submissions and comments are included in Appendix A. 
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1  Background 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The role of information and communications technologies (ICT) in teaching and 
learning continues to grow. Many innovative technologies are emerging, and teaching 
practice and content is now increasingly expected to be delivered ‘anytime, anywhere’. 
Over the past nine years, the Department of Education and Early Childhood 
Development (DEECD) has spent around $1.6 billion on the provision of ICT services 
in government schools. This amount excludes Commonwealth funding and schools’ 
own direct ICT expenditure. DEECD estimates that it will spend a further $2.6 billion 
over the next 10 years on ICT investment for government schools. 
Identifying the impact of ICT on student learning is a challenging exercise. In 2010, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reported that there is no 
‘clear cut evidence on the expected benefits’ from learning technologies. 
In light of this, it is important that government investment in learning technologies is 
underpinned by rigorous business cases and planning, careful project implementation, 
and effective evaluation of achievement against expected outcomes. 
1.2 Learning technologies 
The term ‘learning technologies’ refers to a broad range of ICT tools that can be used 
to support learning, teaching and assessment. These tools include interactive boards 
and learning materials as well as networked technology such as online learning 
environments. Learning technologies also include devices such as handheld, desktop 
or laptop computers. 
DEECD defines the role of learning technologies as tools or resources ‘to support 
teaching and learning by enabling users to communicate, create, collaborate, 
disseminate, store and manage information’. 
1.3 Digital Learning Statement 
The government’s Digital Learning Statement (the Statement) was released in 
October 2010 and is the current policy relating to ICT use in school education. 
The Statement’s vision is for all teachers and students to have access to contemporary 
technology and world-class digital content with which to create, communicate and 
collaborate locally and globally. 
Background 
2       Learning Technologies in Government Schools Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
The Statement notes that learning technologies in the school environment can: 
• improve students’ confidence and attitudes towards their own learning, behaviour 
and attendance 
• promote improved opportunities for students to learn through collaboration and 
conversation 
• improve connections with the real world and provide access to global 
communities with expertise and perspectives that can enrich learning. 
The Statement identified three objectives: 
• provision of ‘anywhere, anytime’ access 
• advancing teacher practice in the use of digital learning in teaching 
• access to high quality resources, tools and data. 
1.4 VicSmart broadband network 
The 2005–06 State Budget allocated $89.3 million to VicSmart (first referred to as 
SmartOne when it was announced in April 2005) to provide at least 2 megabits per 
second (Mbps) broadband data communication services to all government schools. 
Full implementation of VicSmart required the laying of fibre-optic cables to the ‘school 
gate’. The network was designed to allow schools to effectively access online 
information and resources. Prior to VicSmart, most government school bandwidth was 
limited to 64 kilobits per second (Kbps), which did not allow for quick access to online 
materials. 
VicSmart was delivered through the whole-of-government 2002 Telecommunications 
Procurement and Management Strategy. This strategy consolidated the purchase and 
management of fixed voice, mobile, telephony and data carriage services across 
government. 
The contracts for the provision of voice, mobile and data carriage services are jointly 
referred to as telecommunications carriage services. In July 2004, the 
telecommunications carriage services contract was awarded for the provision of 
broadband data services, including to all government schools. 
1.4.1 Rollout of VicSmart  
The VicSmart rollout started in October 2005. Haddon Primary School near Ballarat 
and North Fitzroy Primary School were the first beneficiaries. Internet connectivity 
increased roughly 60 times—from 64 Kbps to 4 Mbps. 
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Since its first rollout in 2005, VicSmart had been upgraded four times: 
• In 2009, all government schools were upgraded from 4 Mbps to at least 10 Mbps. 
• In 2010, larger school campuses received faster bandwidth, at 20 Mbps and 
50 Mbps. The basis for this upgrade was student population. Schools with 
enrolments of 500 to 999 students were upgraded to 20 Mbps, and those with 
enrolments greater than 1 000 received 50 Mbps bandwidth. 
• Later in the same year, all metropolitan government schools with 10 Mbps 
broadband bandwidth were upgraded to 20 Mbps. The bandwidth allocation for 
non-metropolitan schools remained at 10 Mbps due to additional costs estimated 
at $4.5 million per annum. 
In 2012, a further 244 schools were upgraded, including 11 that received up to 
100 Mbps bandwidth. The main driver for this upgrade was the need to support access 
to network applications such as videoconferencing and voice over internet protocol, 
which require Quality of Service network technology. Until this time, VicSmart provided 
base bandwidth only, and did not support Quality of Service traffic. 
1.5 The Ultranet e-learning system 
The Ultranet is a Victoria-wide learning platform and ICT system that students, parents 
and teachers of government schools can access via the internet. 
The DEECD website says that students and teachers can use the Ultranet for online 
learning activities and for collaborating and communicating with students from within 
their school and across Victorian government schools. 
The system is also designed to allow parents to access information that will help them 
keep up to date with their child’s learning. 
The Ultranet was described in the Statement as the key foundation plank or key 
enabler of the three components of the vision for ICT in the classroom. 
1.5.1 Election commitment 
In November 2006, Victorian parents were told by the government that they would get 
virtual access to their child’s classroom 24 hours a day, seven days a week under a 
$60.5 million plan to revolutionise learning. 
Figure 1A shows the components of the Ultranet announced in November 2006. 
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  Figure 1A
Election commitment for Ultranet components  
Commitment 
Connect the entire school community—parents, students, teachers and administrators—
in a way never before possible. 
Consolidate school administrative functions into the one system and lighten teachers’ 
burden. 
Allow parents to: 
• log into their child’s classroom 
• check teachers’ lesson plans and their child’s homework and results 
• communicate directly with teachers by email 
• monitor school attendance, which will be recorded twice a day 
• receive automatic notification of non-attendance via text, email or phone call.  
Give students: 
• their own virtual work spaces with homepages and personally tailored lesson plans, 
which will be accessible via the internet  
• the ability to keep up to date with their education while away from school due to illness 
or family reasons and get teacher feedback much faster. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, based on Department of Education and Early 
Childhood Development media release, issued 13 November 2006.  
The Ultranet was presented as a revolutionary educational tool that would ‘connect the 
entire school community—parents, students, teachers and administrators—starting in 
2007’. 
1.5.2 The 2007 Ultranet business case  
The 2007 business case vision for the Ultranet was for an intuitive, student-centred 
electronic learning environment that supports high quality learning and teaching. 
Its objectives were to: 
• improve responsiveness to individual learning needs 
• provide better information to parents, the school system and government  
• improve the efficiency of the learning environment and school administration 
• adopt an enterprise approach to intranet development 
• exploit previous ICT investments. 
The business case noted that there were many commercial ICT solutions available in 
the market, and that many schools were already using these. However, it emphasised 
that no single solution could provide the full level of scalability, security, interoperability 
and functionality that is needed to meet the identified business needs and objectives of 
the Ultranet. 
According to the Ultranet business case, some 1.5 million Victorian students, teachers 
and parents were expected to use the Ultranet when fully operational. Figure 1B 
summarises the Ultranet’s identified eight key performance indicators.  
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  Figure 1B
Ultranet key performance indicators 
Benefit  Key performance indicators 
Establish a school 
environment for the future 
Number of students using Ultranet (target 70 per cent) 
Improve the educational 
outcomes for Victorians 
 
Number of students accessing online learning resources in 
the Ultranet (target 65 per cent) 
Number of teachers accessing resources, preparing 
curriculum plans, delivering Ultranet-based resources 
(target 65 per cent) 
Reduce the administrative 
burden on teachers and 
school leaders 
Efficiency in administrative processes (target 20 per cent 
over baseline data) 
Reduce the future cost of 
education 
 
Number of external software packages used to assist 
school administration (target 30 per cent decrease over 
baseline data) 
Cost of external software packages used by government 
schools to assist in school administration (target 15 per cent 
over baseline) 
Improve educational 
opportunities for regional, 
rural and remote Victorians 
 
Number of students participating in online collaborative 
technology via the Ultranet (target 30 per cent of regional 
and rural schools’ students) 
Number of teachers accessing online content and 
communities via the Ultranet (target 30 per cent of regional 
and rural schools’ teachers) 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on Department of Education and Early 
Childhood Development documentation and the 2007 Ultranet business case. 
1.5.3 Failed tender in 2007 and subsequent re-scoping 
A request-for-tender to develop and manage the Ultranet was released to the market 
on 1 August 2007. All bids received were in excess of $100 million and resulted in 
DEECD being unable to nominate a successful tenderer.  
Following this failed tender, the Ultranet project was re-scoped to fit the approved 
budget of $60.5 million. Consequently, the Ultranet’s business requirements were 
reduced by 90 per cent from the 1 260 functions stated in the 2007 business case to 
131 functions contained in the 2008 request-for-tender specifications.  
The revised Ultranet project focused on the delivery of learning and teaching 
components, a parent portal and ‘sufficient’ functionality to support these areas. When 
re-scoping the Ultranet, consideration was also given to purchasing an off-the-shelf 
product rather than developing a bespoke solution.  
In addition to re-scoping and reducing the Ultranet’s functionality, the concurrent user 
requirement was reduced from 250 000 users to 78 000 users and total storage was 
reduced from 330 terabytes (TB) to 160 TB, reductions of 69 per cent and 51 per cent 
respectively. 
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1.5.4 Procurement and deployment 
DEECD released a selective request for tender in November 2008. Four bids were 
received when the tender closed on 23 December 2008. 
The Ultranet Master Agreement was signed with the successful tenderer on 
30 June 2009 for the contract price of $64.6 million. The price included $47.5 million 
for the build and delivery, and $17.1 million for application hosting, software 
maintenance, disaster recovery and help desk support until 30 June 2013. 
The Ultranet rollout to government schools commenced in May 2010. On 
9 August 2010, government school principals and assistant principals attended the 
Ultranet ‘Big Day Out’ at the Melbourne Convention and Exhibition Centre. 
Government school teachers across the state were asked to sit at their desks to 
participate in a trial of the Ultranet. 
However, the Ultranet suffered user access issues and teachers waited all morning for 
the system to become available. DEECD explained to the participants that technical 
issues were affecting the Ultranet and that work was being done to correct the 
problems. When the Ultranet went live in the afternoon, it suffered further login issues 
and performed slowly and unreliably. 
Even in its reduced form, significant Ultranet functionalities have not been fully 
delivered, and they continue to be deployed to government schools at the time of 
finalising this report. 
1.5.5 Ultranet oversight 
Executive sponsorship and management of the Ultranet rests with the Ultranet Project 
Board, comprised of executives from various DEECD divisions and some private 
sector representatives. The Ultranet Project Board meets monthly and is chaired by 
the DEECD Deputy Secretary, School Education Group. 
The Ultranet Project Board is responsible for the Ultranet’s business management and 
project delivery functions. The project team reports to the board and its responsibilities 
include giving advice on Ultranet strategy and policy, change management within 
schools, and DEECD’s relationship with the contractor. Project delivery functions 
include contract and service level management, data analysis, major incident 
management, and solution architecture and integration. 
Software development, release management and application support, are the 
contractor’s responsibilities. 
Operational functions relating to the live ICT system are managed either by the 
contractor or by DEECD’s Information and Technology Division. A contractor-provided 
help desk is currently available to users until 30 June 2013. 
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1.6 Audit objective and scope 
The objective of this audit was to examine the effectiveness of the application of 
learning technologies in government schools. 
In particular, the audit examined DEECD’s planning, delivery and management of 
learning technologies across the government school system. 
To address the objective, the audit examined whether DEECD: 
• conducted robust research on the most appropriate use of ICT in government 
school teaching environments 
• developed effective strategies to implement learning technologies in government 
schools and supported teaching staff to adopt these technologies 
• is monitoring achievement of desired outcomes, including realisation of purported 
benefits described in the business cases used to support funding decisions for 
the Ultranet and VicSmart. 
1.7 Audit method and cost 
The audit was performed in accordance with section 15 of the Audit Act 1994 and the 
Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards. 
The total cost was $310 000.  
1.8 Report structure 
The report is structured as follows: 
• Part 2 – Digital Learning Statement  
• Part 3 – Case study: VicSmart broadband connectivity for schools  
• Part 4 – Case study: the Ultranet e-learning system.  
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2  Digital Learning Statement 
 
At a glance 
Background  
The government’s Digital Learning Statement (the Statement) was released in 
October 2010 and remains the current policy for information and communications 
technology (ICT) in school education. Its vision is for all teachers and students to have 
access to contemporary technology and world-class digital content with which to 
create, communicate and collaborate locally and globally. 
Conclusion 
The Statement does not provide a strategy, action plan or framework for investing in 
learning technologies.  
This means that departmental staff and school leaders have little guidance on how 
learning technology initiatives can be appropriately planned and integrated to build 
upon past and present ICT investments. 
Findings  
• The Statement was not informed by robust and comprehensive research and 
does not make a clear and cogent case for government investment in learning 
technologies. 
• The Statement did not deliver on the directive of the 2008 Blueprint for Education 
and Early Childhood Development for the Department of Education and Early 
Childhood Development (DEECD) to develop a strategy or plan of action to use 
learning technologies in teaching and learning. 
Recommendation 
DEECD should develop a comprehensive and evidence-based strategy or plan of 
action for use of learning technologies to underpin and guide the significant investment 
in ICT for government schools. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The government’s Digital Learning Statement (the Statement) was released in 
October 2010 and is the current policy information and communication technologies 
(ICT) use in school education. It was developed by the Department of Education and 
Early Childhood Development (DEECD) and was released in response to the 2008 
Blueprint for Education and Early Childhood Development (the Blueprint). 
The Blueprint required DEECD to develop and release an overarching ICT strategy for 
teaching and learning. 
Action 7 of the Blueprint referred to the government’s commitment to improve Victorian 
students’ performance in literacy and numeracy across all sectors. The first step in 
furthering this commitment was to clearly set out the government’s approach to 
unlocking the full potential of ICT usage in schools. 
2.2 Conclusion 
The Statement has no clear action plan or framework for investment in learning 
technologies in the government school system.  
Consequently, departmental staff and school leaders have little guidance on how 
learning technology initiatives can be appropriately planned and integrated to build 
upon past and present ICT investments. 
2.3 Vision and objectives for learning technologies 
The Statement describes the government’s vision and objectives for learning 
technologies in Victorian government schools. The vision is that:  
• all teachers and students have access to contemporary technology and 
world-class digital content with which to create, communicate and collaborate 
locally and globally 
• student learning is engaging, personalised and authentic to enable them to 
become confident and creative individuals and active and informed citizens of the 
21st century. 
The three objectives outlined by the Statement are: 
• Anywhere, anytime access—all students and teachers have appropriate and 
equitable opportunities to use digital devices and systems, including access to a 
range of contemporary digital devices and sophisticated online systems that 
support learning, teaching and knowledge sharing. 
• Advancing teaching practice—all teachers and school leaders build capabilities 
to use digital technology to improve student learning. 
• Access to high quality resources, tools and data—all teachers and students 
have access to quality assured digital resources, tools and rich data sources. 
Digital Learning Statement 
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2.4 Lack of strategy or action plan 
The Statement sets out the vision and objectives for the use of learning technologies in 
government schools. It also highlights previous and ongoing government investments 
in learning technologies.  
However, it does not provide a strategy, clear action plan or framework to achieve the 
stated vision and objectives and to align future investments.  
DEECD intended to develop a strategy or framework for future ICT initiatives when the 
department was developing the Statement. A proposal was made to identify the 
appropriate initiatives and investments required to address gaps and barriers identified 
in the then current delivery of learning technologies in government schools.  
However, this work was not undertaken, and the Statement did not include any 
reference to identified barriers, or a strategy for future action.  
As a consequence, the Statement provides little guidance to DEECD staff and school 
leaders on how future initiatives can and should be appropriately planned to build upon 
past and present investments. 
This also means that the Statement did not deliver on the Blueprint’s expectation to 
develop a strategy to use learning technologies in teaching and learning. 
DEECD asserts that although the Blueprint committed to develop and release a 
strategy, it was the government’s decision to release the Statement, which did not 
include a strategy.  
However, a review of DEECD’s advice to the Minister for Education shows that the 
government was not advised that the Statement did not comply with the Blueprint’s 
directive to develop and deliver a strategy. No further action was taken to develop a 
strategy. 
2.5 Research for the Statement 
The Statement used some national and international research to inform its 
development. It cites a 2007 UK research report suggesting that learning technologies 
can improve learning outcomes.  
However, the cited literature states that the evidence on the impact of ICT on learning 
is ‘as yet inconsistent’, and that there is not a sufficient body of evidence from which 
‘to draw firm conclusions’. 
This view is shared by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), which states in its March 2010 research report, Technology Use and 
Educational Performance in PISA 2006, that policy makers in OECD countries have 
had to adjust their expectations on the impact of ICT use in teaching and learning 
because they could not see clear-cut evidence of the expected benefits. 
Digital Learning Statement 
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An acknowledgment in the Statement of this more cautious view would have provided 
a clearer picture of the challenging context for the use of learning technologies in 
schools and given greater scrutiny of the purported benefits of any investment. 
The lack of clear evidence on the effectiveness of learning technologies in enhancing 
teaching and learning could also have prompted the development of a clear action plan 
for learning technologies in Victorian government schools that focused more 
realistically on how best to minimise cost and risk while maximising benefits. 
The Statement’s absence of robust and comprehensive research means that it does 
not make a cogent case for government investment in learning technologies.  
2.5.1 Evaluation of programs 
In the absence of clear-cut evidence, some reference to outcomes or lessons learned 
from previous government investments in learning technologies would have provided a 
stronger basis or rationale for the Statement.  
DEECD has not been evaluating the effectiveness of most of its learning technology 
initiatives. Therefore, there is no objective evidence that government’s significant 
investment in learning technologies has delivered the intended benefits for Victorian 
students. 
2.5.2 Stakeholder consultation 
The Statement was not informed by consultation with key stakeholders beyond 
departmental staff.  
Input from teachers, parents and student representative groups was not sought to 
clarify expectations or perspectives on what does and doesn’t work with learning 
technologies. 
Recommendation 
1. The Department of Education and Early Childhood Development should develop 
a comprehensive and evidence-based strategy or plan of action for use of 
learning technologies to underpin and guide the significant investment in ICT for 
government schools. 
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3  Case study: VicSmart broadband connectivity for 
schools 
 
At a glance 
Background  
The VicSmart project was rolled out between October 2005 and December 2011. 
Internet connectivity speeds in schools increased roughly 60 times from the previous 
64 Kbps (kilobits per second) to 4 Mbps (megabits per second). All government 
schools are now connected to VicSmart. 
The VicSmart procurement process was relatively straightforward because the 
Department of Education and Early Childhood Development (DEECD) was required to 
use the whole-of-government single-source provider. 
Conclusion 
VicSmart was well planned and underpinned by a business case that provided a robust 
needs and options analysis. 
Although no performance indicators have been developed to measure VicSmart’s 
intended benefits, it is evident that VicSmart is a key enabler of digital learning in 
government schools. It achieves this by providing high quality broadband data access 
to online DEECD and internet-based digital learning resources. 
Findings  
• VicSmart has provided high-capacity and high-speed fibre-optic connectivity to all 
Victorian government schools. 
• Use of VicSmart is increasing in line with the increase in end-user computing 
devices in government schools.  
• Network capacity has been appropriately upgraded to meet increasing bandwidth 
needs over time, with much of this increase matching the increase in internet 
access and usage by government schools. 
Recommendation 
DEECD should develop performance indicators that measure both VicSmart’s ongoing 
operational performance and its achievement of intended benefits. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The rollout of the VicSmart project began in October 2005 and was completed in 
December 2011.  
After installation of the fibre-optic cable to the ‘school gate’, internet connectivity 
speeds increased roughly 60 times from the previous 64 Kbps (kilobits per second) to 
4 Mbps (megabits per second).  
All Victorian government schools are connected to the VicSmart fibre-optic network. 
3.2 Conclusion 
The VicSmart project was well planned and underpinned by a business case providing 
a robust needs and options analysis. 
The Department of Education and Early Childhood Development (DEECD) delivered 
VicSmart on time and on budget. The project has delivered a high-speed broadband 
fibre-optic network providing internet access, email and a range of digital applications. 
Schools report very few problems with VicSmart and its quality, functionality and 
performance parameters are meeting expectations. 
Although no specific performance indicators have been developed to measure the 
realisation of VicSmart’s intended benefits, it is evident that VicSmart is a key enabler 
of digital learning in government schools by providing high quality broadband data 
access to online DEECD and internet-based digital learning resources. 
3.3 Findings 
3.3.1 Planning for the project 
Prior to VicSmart, all Victorian government schools received a narrowband internet 
connection through the VicOne network. Ninety per cent of government schools were 
provided with a 64 Kbps connection speed, while the remaining schools received 
slightly higher bandwidth provisions. 
When first implemented in 1998, VicOne delivered productivity improvements as 
emails replaced surface mail and many administrative reports moved online.  
However, increased demand for internet connectivity placed significant pressure on the 
VicOne network. By 2004, online access became impractical due to the considerable 
length of time required to download emails and web-based reference materials. 
DEECD data shows that in October 2004, Victoria was providing the lowest internet 
bandwidth connectivity among all states and territories. 
Planning to replace VicOne was underpinned by a robust needs and options analysis 
which was contained in the VicSmart project’s 2005 business case. This effectively 
articulated the needs to be addressed and provided a clear rationale for the chosen 
option. 
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It also clearly established a case for government expenditure on the purchase of 
high-speed fibre-optic broadband connectivity as well as providing confidence that the 
project was achievable and could be delivered as planned. 
The business case also noted that broadband internet connections available to most 
Victorian households in 2005 had raised expectations about the performance of online 
services. This placed additional pressure on the government to provide comparable 
access to online services at school. 
Three options were considered for the VicSmart project. A clear analysis of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each option was provided in the business case.  
The preferred option was for all schools to receive an entry-level broadband fibre-optic 
service upgradeable to 100 Mbps.  
The business case explained that this was the best option available because: 
• it provided a scalable platform for the growing data services needs of schools 
• it avoided future costs of up to $60 million by taking advantage of previously 
negotiated pricing for installation of optical fibre in non-metropolitan schools 
• it delivered high quality data services to both metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
schools. 
3.3.2 Project delivery 
In February 2005 the government formally approved VicSmart as an $89 million project 
to be run over four years. This approved budget was in addition to DEECD’s existing 
$18.6 million recurrent annual bandwidth budget.  
VicSmart-related costs have therefore been $163 million for the period 2005–06 to 
2008–09, plus $48 million in ongoing recurrent costs from 2009–10.   
Since it was compulsory for DEECD to use a sole-source contractor, the procurement 
process for VicSmart was relatively straightforward. This saved DEECD time and 
resources by not having to develop request-for-tender documentation, solicit bids and 
evaluate tender proposals. The procurement process was limited to organising 
purchase orders with the sole-source provider in accordance with the VicSmart project 
specification. 
Since completion of rollout, the VicSmart project has provided high-capacity and 
high-speed fibre-optic connectivity to all Victorian government schools. Use of 
VicSmart is increasing in line with the increase in end-user computing devices in 
government schools.  
Network capacity has also scaled-up appropriately to meet increasing bandwidth 
needs. Much of this increase matches the increase in internet access and usage by 
government schools. From the initial 2 Mbps broadband service, upgrades have been 
achieved progressively, as indicated in Figure 3A. 
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  Figure 3A
VicSmart upgrades over time  
Upgrade Description  
Phase 1: 2005 All schools transitioned from VicOne to VicSmart (minimum 2 Mbps in 
each school) 
Phase 2: 2008 Scalable 4 Mbps to all schools connected by fibre-optic cable 
Phase 3: 2010 Upgrade to 10 Mbps for all schools connected by fibre-optic cable 
Phase 4: 2010 Enhanced provisioning of 20 Mbps to 50 Mbps for larger school 
campuses 
Phase 5: 2012 Enhanced provisioning to up to 100 Mbps for larger school campuses 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office review of Department of Education and Early 
Childhood Development documents. 
Timely communication with schools on VicSmart’s implementation and upgrade has 
meant little disruption to school activities.  
During the rollout, regional schools were not disadvantaged and generally received the 
service at about the same time as metropolitan schools. 
DEECD also advised all schools prior to the rollout of VicSmart that the significantly 
higher download speeds would affect their internet service provider (ISP) costs. 
Schools were asked to develop strategies to monitor and manage ISP costs, as 
DEECD currently pays all ISP-related costs for government schools.  
Continuing to benchmark VicSmart against national and international standards, 
DEECD has upgraded speeds to up to 100 Mbps (depending on school enrolments), 
making Victoria compliant with the Ministerial Council for Education, Early Childhood 
Development and Youth Affairs bandwidth provisioning target of 8.7 Kbps per student. 
3.3.3 Benefits realisation 
VicSmart is delivering the intended benefits of providing reliable high-speed internet 
connectivity to all Victorian government schools. 
Although no performance indicators have been developed to measure VicSmart’s 
intended benefits, it is evident that VicSmart is a key enabler of digital learning and 
provides high quality broadband data access to both online DEECD and internet-based 
digital learning resources.  
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  Figure 3B
Assessment of VicSmart’s expected benefits  
VicSmart benefits as defined in the 2005 business case Achieved  
Learning and teaching benefits  
• Provide access to online multimedia learning materials from any school 
computer.  
 
• Capacity to deliver lesson via videoconference between all schools, 
leading to increased staffing flexibility.  
 
• Enable online testing and examinations from any school site   
Administration and management benefits  
• Able to centralise data and software, lowering cost and improving data 
quality and reporting.  
 
Schools infrastructure benefits  
• Future cost reduction. All schools provided with scalable optical 
fibre-based broadband. Affordable upgrades available as required.  
 
• Improved productivity of information and communications technologies 
resources by enabling support and configuration from clusters or 
centrally to optimise service delivery, performance and efficiency.  
 
• Improved productivity. Software will be deployed and supported across 
the network rather than onsite. 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office.  
DEECD receives monthly reports on VicSmart’s operational performance. Information 
from the service provider’s monthly reports is used to inform key management 
decisions, including phased upgrades of VicSmart over time.  
Principals and teachers at the schools visited during the audit, as well as other 
stakeholders, have confirmed that VicSmart is enabling digital learning by providing 
access to online resources and enabling videoconferencing between schools.  
A teacher in one of the visited schools said that if VicSmart was to be turned off, ‘digital 
learning in Victorian government schools would come to a halt’. 
Recommendation 
2. The Department of Education and Early Childhood Development should develop 
performance indicators that measure both VicSmart’s ongoing operational 
performance and its achievement of intended benefits. 
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4  Case Study: the Ultranet e-learning system 
At a glance 
Background 
The Ultranet is a Victoria-wide digital learning platform and ICT system. Government 
school students, parents and teachers can access the Ultranet via the internet.  
Conclusion 
The Ultranet was poorly planned and implemented. Some six years after its 
announcement as a government priority, it is yet to deliver the benefits expected for 
students, parents and schools. It is significantly late and over budget, has very low 
uptake by users, and has reduced functionality compared with what was originally 
announced.  
This audit also identified a number of serious probity, financial management and 
procurement issues.  
Findings  
• The Ultranet has not delivered its main objectives or expected benefits. 
• There were a number of serious process issues and apparent probity breaches in 
relation to the Ultranet procurement.  
• No cost-benefit analysis has been conducted to determine whether the Ultranet 
provides value for money, or whether the same functionalities could have been 
delivered more cost effectively. 
• Use of the Ultranet is low, and declining.  
• Poor quality financial data means that actual capital and operating expenditure 
for the Ultranet is unclear.  
Recommendations 
The Department of Education and Early Childhood Development should: 
• urgently review its investment in the Ultranet 
• conduct an agency-wide review of its internal tendering, probity and financial 
management practices in light of the serious issues identified by this audit  
• expedite the provision of guidance to schools on the current status of the Ultranet 
as the department’s key learning technology investment, and clarify the policy 
context of schools’ autonomy in purchasing non-Ultranet learning technologies. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The Ultranet was announced in November 2006 as a $60.5 million project. It was 
expected to provide an online teaching, learning and assessment system for all 
government schools.  
Over its life, the Ultranet has been the subject of three business cases and two tender 
processes. 
The project is in a ‘business as usual’ phase of the contract, which expires in 
June 2013. 
4.2 Conclusion 
The Ultranet has been poorly planned and implemented. None of its three business 
cases had a well thought out needs analysis or gave comprehensive options to deliver 
the project.  
Some six years since its announcement as a government priority, the Ultranet has not 
delivered any of the main objectives that were expected when the project was funded. 
The Ultranet is significantly late and over budget—and with limited functionality—when 
compared with what was originally announced. The full costs of the project are poorly 
recorded by the Department of Education and Early Childhood Development (DEECD) 
and a conservative estimate of actual costs by June 2013 is $180 million, or close to 
300 per cent above the first announced budget. 
This audit has detected a number of serious procurement and probity lapses that have 
triggered further review and action by the department. Although the department’s work 
is not yet complete, there is no assurance that the tender process was rigorous, or that 
the chosen delivery option represented value for money. 
Use of the Ultranet is well below expectations, with only 10 per cent of students and 
27 per cent of teachers logging into the system. Because of its very low and declining 
usage, and the ambiguous guidance from DEECD about whether schools can opt out 
of the system, the viability of the Ultranet as the government’s key learning technology 
investment is now under serious threat. 
DEECD has not given sufficient attention to understanding the negative effect that the 
continuing low usage, as well as the opt-out issue, is having on delivery of expected 
benefits from the Ultranet. These shortcomings are also diluting the return on 
investment for the significant public funds that have already been spent. 
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4.3 Findings 
4.3.1 Planning for the project 
Three business cases 
Over time, the Ultranet project has been the subject of three business cases, with one 
rejected and two endorsed by government. 
None of these business cases provided a robust needs analysis and also did not 
provide a sound basis for approval of the project. They did not answer the ‘Why 
invest?’ question for the Ultranet. 
The first business case was developed in early 2007 and was rejected by government. 
The second business case, submitted in July 2007, was a revised version of the first. 
This formed the basis of the (failed) tender process initiated in 2007. 
The third business case was presented to government in May 2009 after the second 
procurement process had been initiated and almost immediately before the Ultranet 
contract was awarded to the service provider in June 2009. 
This was a serious departure from the usual process of developing a business case 
prior to embarking on a procurement process. The Department of Treasury and 
Finance’s (DTF) Lifecycle Investment Framework states that the development of a 
business case must occur before the procurement phase. 
Needs analysis 
The 2007 and 2009 business cases stated a number of business drivers for the 
development of the Ultranet described in Figure 4A.  
  Figure 4A
Identified needs for the Ultranet  
2007 business case 2009 business case  
Critical need for a customised learning 
environment, i.e. teachers are unable to centrally 
source and share learning resources. 
Same 
Poor quality of information available to education 
stakeholders, i.e. teachers and school leaders 
have difficulties in tracking student progress from 
year to year and between schools.  
Same 
Failure to maximise return on previous information 
and communications technologies (ICT) 
investments, i.e. existing disparate school 
systems inhibit interoperability with other systems. 
Same 
Massive inefficiencies in administration for 
schools, i.e. too much time is spent on 
time-consuming tasks that take the focus away 
from learning and teaching. 
Not included – administration was 
dropped as an Ultranet functionality in 
the 2009 business case. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
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The purpose of a needs analysis in a business case is to identify the fundamental need 
for an investment including the problems, issues or circumstances of the current 
situation that needs to be addressed. 
Both business cases failed to provide sufficient material to explain the context and 
extent of the identified issues. For example, with regard to ‘massive inefficiencies in 
administration’, the business case did not explain how much teachers’ time would be 
released through the automation of these administrative tasks, nor did it estimate the 
extent to which this could improve teachers’ productivity.  
Options analysis 
Three options were considered in both the 2007 and 2009 business cases. 
  Figure 4B
Options analysis for the Ultranet 
2007 business case 2009 business case 
Do nothing—allow schools to determine 
and purchase their own learning software 
solution ($67 million estimated cost) 
Do nothing—allow schools to determine 
and purchase their own learning software 
solution ($67 million estimated cost) 
Further develop and deploy early version 
of Ultranet trialled in several schools in 
2006 ($72 million estimated cost) 
Negotiate contract with preferred tenderer 
with DEECD/contractor as integration 
partners ($60.4 million estimated cost)(a) 
Develop and deploy an Ultranet solution 
($83 million estimated cost)(a) 
Negotiate contract/s with preferred 
tenderer and a third party as systems 
integrator ($68.6 million estimated cost)  
(a) Preferred option.  
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office analysis of Department of Education and Early 
Childhood Development documents. 
In the 2009 business case, there was little relationship between the options presented 
and the needs identified for the proposed project. Instead of presenting options on the 
appropriate type of investment to address the identified needs, the options were types 
of contractual arrangements that DEECD could have with the preferred tenderer. 
The options presented for 2009 should have been similar to those of the 2007 
business case, albeit in a de-scoped and reconfigured version of the concept, as per 
the decision in May 2008 to endorse the reconfiguration of the Ultranet to fit the 
original $60.5 million announced budget. 
The various Ultranet business cases did not answer the ‘Why invest?’ question nor did 
they provide a sound basis for the project’s approval. 
Estimated costs do not reflect full project costs 
The 2009 business case estimated the cost of the preferred option at $60.4 million. 
This is not an accurate estimate of costs for this option. 
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By the time the May 2009 business case was prepared, DEECD knew that the Ultranet 
contract would cost $64.6 million. This means that in line with the business case’s 
figures, a more accurate estimate for the preferred option would have been 
$69.6 million (i.e. given that $5 million from DEECD’s project development costs had 
been incurred up to June 2009). 
Further, this $69.6 million estimate does not include the costs to be incurred by 
DEECD as systems integrator. Based on DEECD’s estimates, this would be about 
$5 million. 
This means that the estimated cost for the preferred option in the 2009 business case 
should have been about $74.6 million and not $60.4 million. 
The disconnection between the options presented and the identified needs for the 
Ultranet, and the failure to accurately estimate the costs for the preferred option, show 
that the options analysis conducted for the Ultranet was very poorly considered.  
This, together with the weakness of the needs analysis to provide sufficient material to 
explain the context and extent of identified issues, means that the Ultranet business 
cases failed to provide a sound and reliable basis for government investment in the 
Ultranet project. 
4.3.2 Project delivery 
Procurement process 
Consistent with public sector practice, the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) 
and DTF provided advice to government at key decision points over the life of the 
Ultranet project.  
The project continued despite advice from central agencies that it should cease or be 
delayed. There is no trail of documentary evidence to explain whether or how DEECD 
addressed the many critical issues raised by DPC and DTF. 
It is difficult to understand why the Ultranet procurement was able to proceed to 
contract execution, given the significant concerns raised by DPC and DTF, as well as 
the many adverse ratings that DEECD had received from various Gateway reviews 
since the project first commenced. 
Further, this audit detected a number of serious process and probity issues in relation 
to the tendering and procurement for Ultranet. DEECD has advised that it has 
commenced a number of actions and further detailed investigations in response to 
these matters. In May 2008—after the failure of the first Ultranet request for tender to 
receive a suitable bid from the market—DPC recommended that the Ultranet project 
be stopped. DTF also expressed concerns about the future of the Ultranet. 
Subsequently, the government decided to de-scope and redefine the Ultranet project in 
alignment with the originally announced $60.5 million budget. After this endorsement, 
the originally required number of Ultranet functions (e.g. automatic text messages to 
parents when their children are absent or late) was reduced from 1 260 to 131. 
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In May 2009—just prior to the final approval of contract execution—government 
received further advice from both DPC and DTF counselling against proceeding with 
the Ultranet project. 
For example, DTF queried whether DEECD was breaching due process and major 
project protocols by seeking approval to enter into a contract without any 
documentation of final positions reached on threshold issues. 
DTF also advised that external scrutiny and reporting was warranted so that DEECD 
could: 
• clarify how it intended to deliver a project with a fixed budget of $60.5 million 
when the preferred tenderer’s offer was $77.3 million 
• explain how, when it had concerns about the preferred tenderer’s ability to 
perform the role of system integrator, it had decided to be ‘integration partners’, 
considering that this arrangement would increase DEECD’s risks and 
responsibilities in managing and implementing the Ultranet 
• explain why it had not provided the required implementation plan and risk 
management frameworks 
• make government fully aware of all Ultranet functionalities that will not be 
delivered as previously publicly committed, noting the significantly reduced 
project scope. 
It is the responsibility of the sponsoring department to verify the data and assumptions 
contained in business cases, as well as follow up any questions from central agencies. 
Further, there is no trail of documentary evidence to explain whether or how DEECD 
addressed the many critical issues raised by DPC and DTF. 
This external scrutiny requested by DTF did not take place. No further advice was 
provided by DEECD on the issues raised before the execution of the contract with the 
service provider one month later. 
It is difficult to understand why the Ultranet procurement was able to proceed to 
contract execution, despite these significant concerns raised by DPC and DTF, as well 
as the many adverse ratings that DEECD had received from various Gateway reviews 
since the project first commenced.  
This situation demonstrates a clear lack of accountability and integrity in the checks 
and balances in place to scrutinise project approvals and expenditure. 
Gateway reviews 
In addition to objections raised by central agencies, the project received a number of 
adverse Gateway ratings. Figure 4C shows that the Ultranet received a ‘red’ rating for 
four of the five Gateway reviews conducted during the planning phase.  
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  Figure 4C
Gateway reviews during the planning phase  
Date Phase Rating Outcome 
May 2007 Gateway 2 – 
business case 
review 
RED  
(critical and urgent, action on 
recommendations should be 
taken immediately) 
In all instances, 
the project 
proceeded to the 
next phase with 
little evidence 
that issues 
identified were 
rectified and 
recommended 
actions were 
implemented. 
May 2007 Gateway 3 – 
procurement 
strategy review 
RED 
Apr 2008 Gateway 4 – 
contract decision 
review 
RED 
Oct 2008 Gateway 3 – 
procurement 
strategy review 
(second) 
AMBER  
(critical and not urgent, actions on 
recommendations should be 
carried out before further key 
decisions are taken) 
Feb 2009 Gateway 4 – 
contract decision 
review (second) 
RED 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office analysis of Department of Education and Early 
Childhood Development documents. 
The DTF-commissioned Gateway Review Team expressed concern that there was a 
high risk that the Ultranet was not going to be achieved within budget because the 
$60.5 million project budget had not been informed by a full scoping exercise.  
In several instances, the review team also noted that it was unable to perform a 
comprehensive assessment because the necessary documentation was not complete 
and had not been provided prior to the review. 
DEECD did not adequately address more than 60 per cent of the recommendations in 
the Gateway reviews for the planning phase. For example, the following 
recommendations were not actioned when developing the revised 2007 business case: 
• clarify the value of expected efficiencies and/or cost reduction benefits  
• clearly define the educational outcomes which the project aims to deliver, and its 
effect in schools  
• update the budget, review the training and change management required, and 
more effectively capture the costs of the change program. 
Appropriate action from DEECD on these recommendations may have led to a better 
planned and implemented Ultranet project.  
Process and probity issues in the evaluation of tender bids 
DEECD’s evaluation of tender bids for the second request for tender in 2009 raises 
some serious questions about DEECD’s decision to award the delivery of the Ultranet 
to the preferred tenderer. 
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In February 2009, the Ultranet Project Board suspended the contracted service 
provider as a bidder (due to what DEECD described as untruthfulness in some tender 
responses) until just before the final stage of the evaluation process.  
DEECD could not explain how its tender evaluation process could have selected a sole 
short-listed tenderer that had been previously suspended from the process. 
Tender evaluation documents repeatedly note DEECD’s doubts about the ability of the 
service provider to deliver the Ultranet. Serious concerns were also raised about its 
lack of industry experience as a systems integrator and capability to deliver a project of 
the size and scale of the Ultranet. The proposal also did not follow the preferred prime 
contractor arrangement requested in the request for tender.  
Coaches and support for Ultranet implementation 
While DEECD has provided a significant level of support to teaching staff to adopt and 
integrate learning technologies in teaching practice, DEECD has not provided that 
support for long enough.  
The Ultranet coaching program was poorly timed in that it commenced too early, i.e. 
two years before the Ultranet started being deployed in schools. Significant technical 
issues and a delay in delivering the Ultranet until Term 3 of 2010 meant that teachers 
were unable to make maximum use of the help provided by the coaches when it was 
most required. While teachers found the training useful, its timing was ineffective 
because they were unable to apply the learning within a live system.   
DEECD did not understand that teachers would require regular and sustained 
coaching and training over a period to properly adopt and integrate learning 
technologies. This could have been achieved in a number of different ways, such as by 
providing sufficient resources to support the lead teacher program on an ongoing 
basis. 
DEECD implemented a lead teacher program so that at least two trained teachers 
were available at each government school to provide on-site support. This program 
had mixed results, and depended on the school leadership team’s commitment to 
using the Ultranet. It also depended on teachers’ willingness to use the inherent 
capabilities of the VicSmart network and the broader internet and Edumail email 
systems to provide other learning tools. 
On 9 August 2010, DEECD organised a pupil-free day, or ‘Big Day Out’, for teachers to 
trial the Ultranet. Teachers across the state were asked to sit at their desks to 
participate in this live trial.  
As already discussed in the Background chapter of this report, the Ultranet system did 
not operate as planned, and teachers were unable to trial the system as expected. 
However, teachers and principals at some schools implemented a ‘Plan B’ activity with 
Ultranet coaches to enable some learning to take place. 
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Teachers from schools visited as part of this audit, as well as reviews commissioned by 
DEECD, have confirmed that the Big Day Out experience significantly tarnished the 
reputation of the Ultranet among teachers. Since then, many teachers have refused to 
try using the system again. 
A DEECD-commissioned study found that even with support and training, teachers 
reported being overwhelmed by the idea of using the Ultranet in the classroom. They 
also felt unable to put the training provided by Ultranet coaches into practice.  
A common theme from school visits was that teachers needed time to assimilate all the 
information they were receiving and decide how to make best use of the Ultranet in the 
classroom environment. Teachers also said that limited available class time for 
teaching lessons did not allow enough time for system crashes, multiple logins and 
generally slow Ultranet performance.  
Technical support has not been sufficient. There has been no clear process to raise 
technical problems and there have been significant delays in receiving responses to 
issues raised. 
DEECD did not consider that the change management process from introducing the 
Ultranet would entail greater initial workloads for teachers as they learned to use and 
integrate the Ultranet with their teaching practice.  
Even in the longer term, as teachers begin to incorporate more aspects of the Ultranet 
into their teaching, they will need more time to access relevant training programs to 
continually update their ICT skills. Currently there is no provision to support teachers to 
do this professional development work. 
DEECD expects schools to appropriately enable parents to access the Ultranet, 
including providing login assistance and training to use the Ultranet. This responsibility 
also adds to teachers’ workload. 
4.3.3 Benefits realisation 
Transition from project to business as usual 
The Ultranet transitioned from a project to business as usual (BAU) in April 2012.  
Transition to BAU means that responsibility for the Ultranet technical solution now rests 
with DEECD’s IT Division, while the business owner and business team is the Student 
Learning Outcomes Division. BAU also means that the contractor should now be solely 
responsible for hosting and maintenance activities.  
However, not all of the contracted functionalities for the Ultranet were delivered prior to 
transition to BAU. For example, records management, timetabling and student 
reporting are yet to be delivered to schools. DEECD continues to work with the 
contractor to deliver these functionalities. 
The Ultranet contract ends on 30 June 2013. Unless the contract is extended, DEECD 
will need to conduct an open and competitive tender for the continued hosting and 
maintenance of the Ultranet.  
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Costs of Ultranet implementation  
Based on DEECD-provided data, capital and operating expenditure for the Ultranet 
had reached $97 million by June 2012. By June 2013, it is estimated that it will have 
cost nearly $109 million, or some $50 million (83 per cent) more than the $60.5 million 
budget first announced in November 2006.  
However, based on a further review of DEECD’s financial data, we estimate that actual 
capital and operating expenditure was approximately $162 million by June 2012, and 
by June 2013 it is likely to have cost approximately $180 million.  
  Figure 4D
Variance in budgeted versus estimated costs for Ultranet  
 
Note: The project budget up to 2011–12 includes $60.5 million in total estimated investment, 
including $21.8 million for Ultranet coaches, and $9.7 million for ongoing funding for software and 
licensing fees in 2011–12. In addition, the project budget up to 2012–13 includes $9.7 million for 
ongoing funding for software and licensing fees in 2012–13. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
The variance between the DEECD and VAGO estimates is explained by DEECD’s 
failure to record and track all costs relating to the Ultranet. For example, DEECD has 
not classified all relevant Ultranet costs (such as project team staff costs) to the 
Ultranet cost centre code.  
Publicly available information on the Ultranet, such as data provided by DEECD on its 
website, continues to refer to the Ultranet as a $60.5 million government project. This 
is misleading and does not accurately represent the full cost of the Ultranet. 
Despite this significant overall expenditure, no cost-benefit analysis has been 
conducted by DEECD to determine whether the Ultranet provides value for money, or 
whether the same functionality could have been delivered more cost effectively. 
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Functionality: promised versus actually delivered 
Although the Ultranet has been transitioned from a project to BAU, much of the 
functionality promised in November 2006 has either not been delivered or has been 
de-scoped from the original specifications. 
Figure 4E sets out commitments from ministerial statements and business cases 
versus the actual Ultranet capability that has been deployed. 
  Figure 4E
Assessment of VicSmart’s expected benefits  
2007 government commitment  Achieved  
Victorian parents will get virtual access to their child’s classroom 24 hours a 
day, seven days a week under Labor’s $60.5 million plan to revolutionise 
learning. 
 
The Ultranet will allow parents to log in to their child’s classroom, check 
lesson plans, homework and results, attendance, and even communicate 
directly with teachers via email. 
 
Every classroom in a school and every school within the state will be linked, 
starting in 2007, with the rollout completed within three years. 
/(a) 
Students would have their own virtual work spaces with homepages and 
personally tailored lesson plans accessible, via the internet, from anywhere. 
(b) 
The Ultranet will consolidate school administrative functions into the one 
system and lighten the burden on teachers 
 
Parents will be able to monitor school attendance, which will be recorded 
twice a day, with automatic notification via text, email or phone call of 
non-attendance. 
 
(a) Although all schools are now linked to the Ultranet, this started happening in 2010, not 2007. 
(b) While this functionality is now available in the Ultranet, very few students have in fact set up 
their personal work spaces. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
Ultranet use 
At present, use of the Ultranet is well below expectations. DEECD documentation 
shows that, on average, there were fewer than 11 000 teacher and 52 000 student 
unique monthly logins for the period from February 2011 to September 2012.  
This represents only 10 per cent of students and 27 per cent of teachers, or 
4.2 per cent of the 1.5 million total expected Ultranet users projected in both the 2007 
and 2009 business cases. There is no equivalent data on parent usage available from 
DEECD. 
Departmental documentation suggests that real teacher logins may actually be much 
lower. This is because some schools have established the practice of having staff 
regularly log in, so that their presence is centrally recorded, even if they do not 
undertake any activity in the Ultranet. This means that, at best, DEECD’s data is on the 
high side. 
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DEECD data also shows that unique monthly student logins are below 5 per cent for at 
least 50 per cent of the 1 587 schools across the Victorian public school system for the 
period November 2010 to August 2012. The percentage of schools whose students did 
not access the Ultranet at all has also increased from 15 per cent in 2010 to 
21 per cent in 2012.  
While significant online materials and training support has been provided to teachers, 
these have been neither sufficient nor sustained. DEECD has not fully considered the 
demand the Ultranet would have on teachers’ time and workload, particularly in terms 
of teachers’ roles in supporting and guiding parents on how to use the Ultranet. 
System problems have also discouraged uptake across the government school 
system. These include the Ultranet’s technical unreliability and poor performance, the 
lack of appropriate support to develop principals’ and teachers’ ICT competency and 
confidence, and ageing ICT infrastructure and devices (which can affect online access 
to the Ultranet).  
Use of third-party non-Ultranet software in schools 
Prior to the development of the Ultranet concept, many government schools had 
purchased and were using third-party ICT software, applications and platforms, such 
as Moodle and Compass, for classroom learning.  
This practice has continued after the rollout of the Ultranet, with DEECD data 
confirming that the number of schools purchasing and using these third-party 
applications has remained at about the same level as before the introduction of the 
Ultranet. 
While both the 2007 and 2009 business cases were underpinned by the assumption 
that all schools would use the Ultranet, DEECD has advised that government schools 
are not mandated to use the Ultranet. DEECD asserts that this position reflects the 
government’s policy of school autonomy.  
DEECD has also decided to allow schools to have greater control over their Ultranet 
deployment schedules in response to strong feedback from schools. 
In addition, the teachers’ union informed DEECD that it had resolved in March 2010 
that schools should be allowed to determine when and to what extent they should use 
the Ultranet, because the significant issues encountered by teachers when using the 
Ultranet. The union has also recommended to its members various work bans in 
relation to the Ultranet as part of its current pay and conditions campaign. 
Stakeholder consultations and analysis of documentation confirm that the Ultranet was 
intended to be used by all government schools. The change in DEECD’s position, 
allowing schools to opt in or opt out as they please, means that it is highly unlikely that 
the Ultranet’s objective of educational collaboration and providing transferring students 
a seamless transition from school to school will be achieved.  
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The achievement of these objectives relies on all schools across the government 
system using the Ultranet, either by mandating its use or putting significant effort into 
assuring that the system’s functionality, implementation and issues management are 
given appropriate consideration to maximise its use. 
The November 2011 speech by the Minister for Education Victoria as a Learning 
Community refers to the need to complete the functionality and assuring the quality of 
the Ultranet in order to encourage its widespread use.  
DEECD needs to give greater consideration and attention to the current ambiguity in 
regards to the Ultranet opt-out issue. Without near-universal take-up by teachers and 
students—as forecast in all the business cases—most of the benefits will not be 
achievable, and the significant investment of taxpayers’ funds to date will therefore be 
wasted. 
Recommendations 
The Department of Education and Early Childhood Development should:  
3. urgently review its investment in the Ultranet, with a particular focus on: 
• assessing whether the contractor has delivered all functionality as required by 
the contract and what action, if any, needs to be taken to enforce the state’s 
rights 
• rigorously assessing its financial management practices and identifying the 
real, current cost of the Ultranet to determine the extent to which further 
investment is warranted 
• identifying and addressing the underlying causes of low take-up rates across 
the school system by teachers, students and parents 
• providing advice to government on the cost-benefit of decommissioning the 
system now against continuing to fund and rectify the system so that it can be 
implemented as originally expected 
4. conduct an agency-wide review of its internal tendering, probity and financial 
management practices in light of the serious issues identified by this audit 
5. expedite the provision of guidance to schools on the current status of the Ultranet 
as the department’s key learning technology investment, and clarify the policy 
context of schools’ autonomy in purchasing non-Ultranet learning technologies.  
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Appendix A. 
 Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
 
Introduction 
In accordance with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report, or relevant 
extracts, were provided to the Department of Education and Early Childhood 
Development, the Department of Premier and Cabinet and the Department of Treasury 
and Finance, with a request for submissions or comments. 
The submissions and comments provided are not subject to audit nor the evidentiary 
standards required to reach an audit conclusion. Responsibility for the accuracy, 
fairness and balance of those comments rests solely with the agency head. 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Education and Early 
Childhood Development  
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Education and Early 
Childhood Development – continued 
 
 
 

Auditor-General’s reports 
 
Reports tabled during 2012–13 
 
Report title Date tabled 
Carer Support Programs (2012–13:1) August 2012 
Investment Attraction (2012–13:2) August 2012 
Fare Evasion on Public Transport (2012–13:3) August 2012 
Programs for Students with Special Learning Needs (2012–13:4)  August 2012 
Energy Efficiency in the Health Sector (2012–13:5) September 2012 
Consumer Participation in the Health System (2012–13:6) October 2012 
Managing Major Projects (2012–13:7) October 2012 
Collections Management in Cultural Agencies (2012–13:8) October 2012 
Effectiveness of Compliance Activities: Departments of Primary Industries and 
Sustainability and Environment (2012–13:9)  
October 2012 
Auditor-General’s Report on the Annual Financial Report of the State of Victoria, 
2011–12 (2012–13:10) 
November 2012 
Public Hospitals: Results of the 2011–12 Audits (2012–13:11) November 2012 
Water Entities: Results of the 2011–12 Audits (2012–13:12) November 2012 
Port of Melbourne Channel Deepening Project: Achievement of Objectives  
(2012–13:13) 
November 2012 
Portfolio Departments and Associated Entities: Results of the 2011–12 Audits 
(2012–13:14) 
November 2012 
Local Government: Results of the 2011–12 Audits (2012–13:15) November 2012 
Prison Capacity Planning (2012–13:16) November 2012 
Student Completion Rates (2012–13:17) November 2012 
Management of the Provincial Victoria Growth Fund (2012–13:18) December 2012 
VAGO’s website at www.audit.vic.gov.au contains a comprehensive list of all reports issued by VAGO. 
The full text of the reports issued is available at the website.  
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability of reports 
Copies of all reports issued by the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office are available 
from: 
• Victorian Government Bookshop  
Level 20, 80 Collins Street  
Melbourne Vic 3000  
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: 1300 366 356 (local call cost) 
Fax: +61 3 9603 9920 
Email: bookshop@dbi.vic.gov.au 
Website: www.bookshop.vic.gov.au 
• Victorian Auditor-General's Office  
Level 24, 35 Collins Street  
Melbourne Vic 3000  
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: +61 3 8601 7000   
Fax: +61 3 8601 7010  
Email: comments@audit.vic.gov.au 
Website: www.audit.vic.gov.au 
 
